By Suresh Mohanty

The management of Indo-Myanmar border(IMB)has most deservedly, in recent timeshit national headlines and assumed enormous strategicsignificance for three main factors; One;the ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar triggering large scale infiltration(or read migration) into Manipur and Mizoram, Two and interrelatedly; internal strife in Manipur has precipitatedsporadic and targeted attacks in the border areas of the state and Three,Chinese attempts to perpetuate unrest in India’s NorthEast as a policy of indirect approach in response to disturbed situation along the Line of Actual Control.
During his visit to Delhi on 4th January 2024and meeting with the Prime Minister,the Union Home Minister and Minister of External Affairs, the newly elected Chief Minister of Mizoram Mr Lalduhoma  mentioned that any move to fence the 510 kilometre long porous border the State shares with Myanmar is unacceptable as it is a border enforced by the British to divide ethnic Mizos. This is shortly after the union government decided to scrap the Free Movement Regime(FMR)in vogue since 2018 as part of Act East Policy; followed by fencing the entire border. The move was triggered due to security concerns and disturbing the delicate demographic composition of the border states. In fact, the border movement regime has been in existence since colonial times due to the close cultural, ethnic and traditional relationship amongst the border population. The border was delimited in 1967, largely following the alignment along Patkai hills (12552 feet). The FMR was only a formalisation of this practice.  The Home Minister, Mr Amit Shah reiterated the government's resolve to fence the Indo Myanmar border on the lines of Indo- Bangladesh border and scrap the FMR during his visit to Assam on 20 Jan 24 drawing strong objection from the apex students body of Mizoram, Mizo Zirlai Pawl(MZP). Meanwhile,the NSCM(IM), an insurgent group in ceasefire with the Government since 1997 has said that it would never allow the Centre to fence the border with Myanmar as it would further divide the Naga family as a Nation. 
Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, over 40,000 refugees have taken shelter in Mizoram. The recent spike in the clashes between the three brotherhood alliance (comprising of Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the T’ang National Liberation Army) andthe Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army)has only intensified the movement of refugees including soldiers of Tatmadaw into India. The increasing number of attacks on Manipur State security forces of late and the personnel belonging to Meitei community has instigated the radical and armed Meitei Group,Arambai Tenggol to summon all MLAs and MPs belonging to the community to sign a set of 10 demands to the Central government,including delisting of Kukis from Scheduled Tribes and replacement of Assam Rifles from the State. This has been termed as anarchy by the rival Manipur IndigenousTribal Leaders Forum (ITLF), a Kuki group.
The student and youth organisations in the North Eastern States wield considerable power and influence over ethnically aligned people and governance. WhileMizoram and Nagaland have strongly opposed to the Central Government’s planto scrap FMR and fence the border, Manipur not only supports it but has intensified its demand to fence the border. The central government ought to harmonise the sentiments of all ethnic communities in view of the sensitivity of the region. 
The dynamics of Indo Myanmar border varies  from state to state and has long term security and foreign policy ramifications for India. The 1643 kilometre long border involves the states of Arunachal Pradesh (520kms), Nagaland (215kms), Manipur(398kms) and Mizoram(510 kms). The border is manned by Assam Rifles along its entire front, while also being responsible for counter insurgency operations in the hinterland.Unlike other border guarding forces which operate inBorder Out Posts (BOPs) all along the border, Assam Rifles operate in Company Operating Bases (COBs) with somewhat interchangeability of roles of border guarding and CI operations. It happens to be the only border guarding force operationally under the Indian Army but is funded and equipped by the ministry of Home Affairs in line with other border guarding forces(BSF, SSB and ITBP). With about 46 battalions of Assam Rifles around 20  are deployed for border guarding while the balance on counter insurgency operations. The borderwas thus far being  governed by FMRto facilitate border trade and due to ethnic similarities of population on either side of the border.Thisallows population residing close to the border to move up to a distance of 16 kilometres on either side with head loads and permitted to stay up to two weeks with border passes only, valid for a period of one year without the requirement of a visa. The move is controlled over 3 border crossings; Pangsau in Arunachal Pradesh, Moreh in Manipur and Zokhawthar in Mizoram. 
Due to the open nature of the bordercharacterised byrugged and deep forests, lack of infrastructure,  inaccessibility and limited surveillance capability, it has seldom been possible to exercise full and effective control over illegal border crossings. Transborder move of insurgents, arms and narcotics takes place often in connivance with the population residing close to the border for petty renumerations or for fear of reprisal.
In Arunachal Pradesh, the border is shared by the three Southern Districts of Tirap,Changlang and Longing (TCL region) affected by insurgency and have been under AFSPAfor long.  Though there are no insurgent camps and resident insurgents in Arunachal Pradesh, the festering insurgency is supported from the across the border. Of late even the Naga community (Wancho, Tutsa, and Tangsa) in TCL region have dissociated themselves from Nagas of Nagaland and are demanding an autonomous council. The ceasefire between Government of India with a plethora of insurgent groups is  not applicable in Arunachal Pradesh. There have been intermittent attacks on security forces posts launched  from across the border often in connivance with or  in total disdain bythe Myanmar Army. Most insurgent camps across Arunachal Pradesh border belong to NSCN(IM) and its various offshoots as also ULFA. ULFA insurgents operating largely in restive Upper Assam (now in lowest ebb consequent to large scale surrender and recently signed accord in Dec 2023)  find the infiltration through Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh to be the shortest and least contested due to low density of SF deployment and Namdapha reserve forest. 
In Nagaland, ever since the ceasefire  agreement with NSCN(IM) in 1997,  there are designated insurgent camps within which the insurgents groups are relatively free to operate. The terms of  the ceasefire agreement restricts combat operations including along the borders. The ethnic Naga population with spill over into Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Assam and even Myanmar ( the long standing demand of greater Nagalim) furiously oppose the border fencing that will not only divide the ethnic Nagas on either side of the IMB but will also restrict their area of influence. The Central government having frozen the terms of the Naga Peace Accord on 31st of October 2019,  the agreement continues to be in a limbo due to the demand for a separate flag and a constitution by NSCN(IM). At this stage any attempt to fence the border will be fiercely opposed by Nagas.
Manipur,  which shares a border of 398 kms with Myanmar has a number of designated insurgent camps consequent to a similar ceasefire agreement  based on Suspension of Operations(SOO, that is now being opposed by Maitei group) and TakenNote Of (TNO) camps, belonging to  disparate insurgent groups.Commencing with the Manorama Devi episode, a large number of police stations areas in Imphal have been removed from AFSPA permitting insurgents  to operate with impunity in the Imphal valley. There have been number of attacks on security forces personnel launched from camps across the border including the  the attack on Colonel Viplav and his family in Nov 2021.In the past, in response to an attack on the convoy of 6 Dogra in 2015, which resulted in the death of 18 personnel, a transborder  operation against insurgent camps was launched by Indian army in coordination with the Myanmar Army. This was followed by Sunrise series of joint operationsin 2019-20 which met with limited success.
The opposition byMizoram is largely a by-product of ethnic affiliation with population close to the IMB in Myanmar. The situation has become more intense after the military takeover in Myanmar in Feb 2021 and large scale refugee influx into India.Though Mizoram is not affected by insurgency but serves as a corridor for drugs and narcotics.
Notwithstanding the Central Government’s resolve to fence the IMB, execution will most certainly be a challenge. It is not merely the fencing which needs to be foolproof , it also needs to have all weather access to the fence and keeping it  under observation and fire to be an effectivedeterrent.This will require huge investment in construction, lighting, surveillance and physical deployment of troops. Smart fencing using technology is a way forward. Some analysts have suggested takeover of the border by BSF. It is important to point out that IMB is least like India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders. The discernible reduction in insurgency in the North East has been a result of painstaking effort by Assam Rifles over decades. It continues to have domain knowledge andexpertise in a sensitive region, the reason why it calls itself the friends of the hill people. Short sightedness should not lead to undoing this enormous advantage. It does not take much time for the region to slide back into alienation and insurgency if we don’t consolidate our hard-earned gains. How the Government of India plans to execute this process remains to be seen.

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Kenter Joya Riba

(Managing Editor)
      She is a graduate in Science with post graduation in Sociology from University of Pune. She has been in the media industry for nearly a decade. Before turning to print business, she has been associated with radio and television.
Email: kenterjoyaz@easternsentinel.in / editoreasternsentinel@gmail.com
Phone: 0360-2212313

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