)The twelfth round of military commander’s level talks between India and China resulted in mutual agreement in disengagement only at Gogra Post (PP 17 A) out of the multiple contentious friction points of Gogra, Hot spring, Depsang plains and Demchok. Reportedly, the Chinese even refused to discuss disengagement at Depsang plains and Demchok prior to the talks. The talks having taken place after more than three months of hiatus since 09 Apr 21 and in the backdrop of wide divergence in the statements given out by the two sides consequent to confabulations between the foreign ministers on 14Jul 21, It would have been naive for anyone to expect any greater concession from the Chinese.
What would have been the Chinese motivation to agree to a pull back from friction points that India insisted. In the ninth round of talks, the motivation was to eliminate Indian domination over Moldo Garrison and neutralize Indian counter action over Kailash ranges; the disengagement was thus swift and verified during the 10th round of talks. Even during the standoff at Doklam in 2017, the disengagement achieved on 28 August 2017 was due to the Chinese having been taken by complete surprise due to an unexpected Indian response in Bhutanese territory and the BRICS summit scheduled in Beijing from 3-5 September that year. The Chinese have incidentally firmed in at Doklam with huge permanent infrastructure besides creeping intoNorthern Bhutan to provide width and depth to the vulnerable Chumbi Valley where the PLA is at a relative disadvantage. 
As Mr. Vijay Gokhale brings out in his book, ‘The Long Game’, how the Chinese negotiate with India;Chinese tend to set the agenda; the narrative for the negotiations and expect unilateral gestures by other party prior to the talks to ensure positive results. Contrary to the statement of Indian foreign minister Mr. S Jaishankar that peace and tranquility in the border area is the basis of India- China relations, Mr Wang Yi believes in consolidation of results of disengagement that has been achieved and acceptance of current status quo; meaning two steps forward and one step back. During the 15 months standoff in Eastern Ladakh, there appears to be no substantive pressure on the Chinese to agree to a restoration of status quo as in April 2020 except what was achieved on the North and South bank of Pangong Tso.  Despite banning of over 200 Chinese apps, increased scrutiny on Chinese investments and excluding Chinese firms from 5G trial in India, the trade between the two countries has only grown further during financial year 20-21 making China as the biggest trading partner of India.Bilateral trade in the first half of the year was USD 57.48 billion, with Indian exports at USD 14.724 billion and Indian imports USD 42.755 billion. The trade deficit in Chinese favour is humongous. Chinese stake in this trade is much lesser and thus the Indian economy tends to suffer more in the event of an economic decoupling. In fact, so is the case even for the US. Take the case of Chinese blocking the export of AFI for manufacturing of vaccines by Indian during the height of second wave. These irritants have been further compounded by denial visas to Indian medical students to study in Chinese universities, blocking of commercial ships with Indian crew to visit Chinese ports and custom officials seizing maps showing Arunachal Pradesh as part of India as per a new regulation. The unexpected visit of Xi Jinping to Nyingchi, along with key politburo members and addressing 281 officers of PLA Ground Force and 29 PLA Air Force besides three lieutenant generals and 27 major generals could not have been entirely coincidental which succeeded as it did after Prime Minister Modiwished the Dalai Lama on his 86th Birthday. There have been many instances in the past of Chinese belligerence along the LAC just prior to the bilateral negotiations. To further isolate India in the South Asian region, Chinese have commenced establishing their own form of SAARC and BIMSTEC in the form of China- South Asia Emergency Supply Reserve and Poverty Alleviation and Coop Development Centre embracing all India’s neighbours.
Negotiation between two sides must ideally be from a position of equality, cooperative and consultative with both agreeing to give and take. In fact, this is what the Chines wanted to establish in their negotiation with the US, both at Anchorage and Beijing. When it comes to negotiating with India, Chinese tend to consider themselves superior and display aggression, arrogance and even put conditionalities prior to the talks.While negotiating with the Chinese, the give and take need not restrict itself to the military field / LAC; in fact, it must involve other components of a nation’s comprehensive national power to leverage extraction of concessions. Seamless discussion at foreign ministers, WMCC and military commanders. If a nation’s relative strength at a given point of time inhibits it to negotiate from a position of strength/equality then the opponents’ weakness / vulnerabilities would have to be taken advantage of. There are instances when despite being a much stronger country both militarily and economically, India has been very accommodative while negotiating with say Nepal / Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
While militarily, in the economic and technological domain, the asymmetry between India and China is stark, there are more than a few vulnerabilities of the Chinese which can be taken advantage of. Be it Covid 19, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hongkong, Taiwan and in the South China Sea, India seems to have distinctly avoided antagonizing the Chinese sensitivities apparently in view of its relative disadvantage in the economic and military field and followed a policy of appeasement. It is imperative for India to leverage its relationship with other world powers in terms of strategic partnerships and even alliances to exploit the Chinese core vulnerabilities / sensitivities to extract concessionsas part of diplomatic statecraft. Evidently Chinese have been sensitive to tighter embrace between India and the US, military operationalization of QUAD, diplomatic relations with Taiwan and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
Indian vulnerabilities along the LAC despite the relative force asymmetry and infrastructure development need not be played beyond a point. With the unprecedented force deployment on either side, the scope for a military victory even at tactical level is extremely limited. In fact, force deployment, beyond a point is counterproductive in terms of logistics and cost of maintaining such large forces in inhospitable terrain. Further, there is a need to generate options for force application under various contingencies for deterrence to be viable and effective. Take the case of large-scale deployment against Pakistan post the attack on Indian Parliament. It didn’t really have the impact it ought to have had. 
Any belligerence by either side to take tactical military advantage would have unintended consequences since neither side can claim to retain complete control over escalation. The medieval style of clashes at Galwan on 15 Jun 20 only goes to prove that neither side wanted the situation to escalate beyond control. Under reporting the numbers of casualties in the Galwan clash and delayed official declaration of a much smaller number is indeed an effort to give a semblance of victory for the Chinese. 
It is unrealistic to expect favorable outcome of negotiations, especially with the Chinese at all times. However, it is important to continue to negotiate albeit to ascertain the opponent’s mindset, body language and appreciated response to a future contingency. India needs to generate areas of strength (including Chinese vulnerabilities) to retain its bargaining position during future negotiations.     
(The writer is Security Advisor to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh)

---

Kenter Joya Riba

(Managing Editor)
      She is a graduate in Science with post graduation in Sociology from University of Pune. She has been in the media industry for nearly a decade. Before turning to print business, she has been associated with radio and television.
Email: kenterjoyaz@easternsentinel.in / editoreasternsentinel@gmail.com
Phone: 0360-2212313

<< Back to News List